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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
FANK LOPEZ,
vs.

Appellant,

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utaih
State Prison,
Respondent.

Case No.
11788

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant seek.s a reversal of a judgment entered
in the Third District Court, in and for the County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah, denying his petition for writ of habeas
corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court, after examining the record and
transcript of the sentencing proceedings, upon its own motion, and without a hearing, dismissed appellant's petition.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the decision of the trial
court should be affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent herewith accepts Appellant's statement
of facts and adds the following.
The transcript of the trial court proceedings wherein
the appellant changed his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty"
was not a part of the record as submitted with appeHant's
brief. However, part of appellant's argument challenges
that proceeding. Therefore, the respondent has obtained
said transcript and filed the same as a supplemental record
in this case. Also, a copy of said transcript has been sent
to
advising him that the same is now a part of
this case on appeal.

In addition, the respondent asks this Court to take
judicial notice of the fact that appellant never timely appealed the conviction which he now ch3Jllenges by writ of
habeas corpus.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT JUDICIALLY DECIDE THE ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT.
The appellant challenges the constitutionality of his
conviction of grand larceny on the grounds thalt (1) he
was denied adequate counsel, (2) that counsel was not
present at the time flor sentencing, and (3) that he was
not fully advised of his rights when he plead guilty. He
did not timely appeal his conviction, but rather, has raised

the foregoing issues by writ of habeas corpus, long after
the time for appeal has expired.
Utah law is clear under these circumstances. If one
is convicted of a crime and fails to timely appeal, he cannot
later use habeas corpus to gain appellate review. Bryant
v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P. 2d 121 (1967).
In the Bryant case, this Court explained the foregoing
principle by saying:
"We do not mean to say that the time honored
writ of habeas corpus does not have a very important and useful purpose in our law. But that
purpose is not to review a final judgment arrived
at through regular proceedings and due process of
law, by a court having jurisdiction. The writ is,
as our rules describe it, an extraordinary writ, to
be used to protect one who is restrained of his liberty where there is no jurisdiction or authority, or
where the requirements of the law have been so
ignored or distorted that the party is substantially
and effectively denied what is included in the term
due proce.<;s of law ... " 19 Utah 2d at 286 and 287.
Later in the opinion this Court concluded:

."No appeal having been taken from the judgment it became final and the issue was res adjudicata. Therefore, consistent with the principles
herein above disoussed, it is not subject to review
in this habeas corpus proceeding." Id. at 287. (Emphasis added.)
In the instant C&"le, the appellant should be denied the
relief prayed for because he failed to redress his alleged
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error by a timely appeal. This is so even though his ailleged
errors are constitutional in nature. This Court implicitly
so held in Brown V. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P. 2d 965
(1968) . Brown was appealing a denial of his petition for
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that he was niot accorded his right to counsel, and that he was not adequately
advised of the consequences of his plea of guilty - the same
contentions that the appellant in the in.sttant case is mak.
ing. This Court cited Bryant in defining when the writ of
habeas corpus is applicable, and then stated:
"If tJhe oontention of error is something which
i,s known or should :be known to the party at the
time judgment was entered, it must be reviewed in
the manner and within the time permitted by regufar prescribed procedure, or the judgment becomes
final and is not subject to further attack, except in
some unusual circumstances as we have mentioned
above." 21 Utah 2d aJt 98. (Emphasis added.)

Clearly, the appellant knew of the alleged errors surrounding his conviction at the time of his trial and certainly could have challenged its validity by timely appealing to this Court. He did not elect to do so. Moreover,
tJhere are no unusual circumstances surrounding this case
which migiht invoke the exception as defined in the Bryant
case and affirmed in the Brown case. Therefore, the judg·
ment of the trial court became final 'and thus cannot now
be reviewed on habeas corpus.
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that this Court
should not judicially decide the issues raised in this appeal,
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but rather, should summarily affirm the judgment of the
trial court below.
POINT II.
POINT I OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF IS NOT A
JUSTICIABLE ISSUE ON THIS APPEAL.
Point I of appellant's brief alleges that appellant was
not adequately represented by counsel. However, this issue
was not raised in his habeas corpus petition, nor was it
considered by the trial court below. The appellant now
wishes this Court to consider this issue for the first time
on this appeal.
Again, Utah law is clear regarding this matter. In
Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118, 388 P. 2d 412 (1964),
the petitioner appealed a denia:l of a writ of habeas corpus.
On appeal, he raised a point for the first time which had
neither been raised in his petition nor by the trial court.
In disposing of this issue, the Court stated:
"This matter was not presented in the pleadings or the hearing before the Fourth District
Court. It is raised for the first time on appeal.
Habeas corpus being a civil remedy, it is not necessary for this Court to consider this point." 15 Utah
2d at 120.
See also Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 358, 431 P. 2d 788
( 1967) and In re Ekker, 19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P. 2d 45
( 1967).
Thus this Court should not judicially decide Point I

'

as raised in the appellant's brief.

b

POINT III.
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED ADEQUATE COUNSEL BECAUSE THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER WAS ASSIGNED TO REPRESENT
HE AND HIS CO-DEFENDANT.
The United States Supreme Court has spoken on this
issue and held that, pursuant to the Si:x:th Amendment, a
def endanrt is entitled to separate counsel during his prosecution if he chooses, Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60
(1942).
Glasser had been appointed counsel who had also been
appointed to represent his co-defendant. Gla.sser objected
to the appointment on the grounds that the dual appointment of counsel would result in prejudice to him, and thus,
he requested independent counsel. The 'Urial court denied
Glasser's request. Glasser appeal. The United States Supreme Court upheld his contention and said:
" ... (we are also) clear that the 'assistance of
counsel' .guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and
unimpaired by a court order requiring that one
lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflictin.r;
interests." 315 U. S. at 70. (Emphasis added.)
Glasser had objected to the Court's simulitaneous appoint·
ment of counsel and had pointed out to the court the nature
of the conflict of interest which would result from the ap·
pointment. 314 U. S. at 68 and 69.
In the instant case, the record is silent on the issue of
whether or not the appellant objected to the court when he
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assigned the legal defender as his counsel. Surely the
appellant knew at the time that the legal defender had also
been assigned to represent his co-defendant. Therefore, if
such simultaneous appointment would have caused the appellant µ;:ejudice, then it was incumbent on him to so advise
the Court. The Glasser case does not hold that one is entitled to appointment of independent counsel when he cannot or does not advise the court of possible conflicts of
interest which may r&'>ult in prejudice to him.
11·as

This standard has been applied by the California Court
of Appeals. In People v. Klimek, 172 Cal. App. 2d 36, 341
P. 2d 722 (1959), ,the defendant appealed raising the same
objection as the appellant now raises on this appeal. In
answer thereto, the Court said :
"In the instant case no objection was made by

anyone, either prior to or during the entire trial,
and it does not appear at all that the appellant or
anyone, prior to the taking of this appeal, was not
satisfied with the alleged appointment. Nor was
there anything to indicate to the trial judge that
there might be conflicting interests, hence it cannot
be held that the trial judge failed in any responsibility in the matter of affording appellant an opportunity for proper representation by counsel." 341
P. 2d at 726.
This same standard has been applied to habeas corpus
petitioners as well. In In re Waltreus, 42 Gal. Rptr. 9, 397
P. 2d 1001 (1965), the court said:
"It would seem, however, that having been advised that he had a right to be repr&<;ented by the
public defender it was incumbent upon petitioner,

..
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had he wished to have other counsel assigiied
. th e matter in the trial court and there · ,
raise
1s no
.
'
claim that he did so." 397 P. 2d at 1005.
In the instant case, the appellant did not object to the
simultaneous appointment of the legal defender as counsel
for he and his co-defendant. As a result, the judge had no
reason to suspect some possible conflict of interest. Th us,
the court below should be affirmed on this issue.

POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT RECORD CLEARLY
SHOWS THAT APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY
AND AD E QUA TEL Y REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING.
It is clear that appellant was in fact represented by
counsel at Ms sentencing (T. 7, 8, 9). However, appellant
argues that because he had different counsel at his sen·
tencing than he had during the proceedings prior thereto,
that in effect he was denied right of counsel at a critical
stage of the judicial process. He argues further that his
prior
had advised him that his sentence would be
like that of his co-defendant, his co-defendant was sentenced to one year in the county jail, (appellant's brief p.
3), and that his new counsel was the cause of the judge
sentencing him to an indeterminate term in the Utah State
Prison.
Appellant's contention can only establish grounds for
habeas corpus relief if he can show that counsel at the time
of his sentencing was incompetent or inadequate.

In order for appellant to show that counsel was inadequ::J.te, he must state facts showing that his representation
was so substandard as to render his representation a farce
or a sham. In Barron v. State, 7 Ariz. App. 223, 437 P. 2d
975 (1968), the Arizona Court of Appeals held:
"We find no error in the lower court's denial of
relief since the appellants have set forth no facts
(citations omitted), which indicate the attorney's
services were so substandard as to render his representation a farce or a sham." 7 Ariz. App. at 225.
(Emphasis added.)
The following cases have also applied this same standard in habeas corpus proceedings: In re Beaty, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 521, 414 P. 2d 817 (1966); McGee v. Crouse, 190
Kan. 615, 376 P. 2d 792 (1962), and Grubbs v. State, 397
P. 2d 522 (Okla., 1964).
In the Beaty, supra, case, the California Supreme
Court stated this standard for inadequacy of counsel and
then gave an example of a situation which might reduce
the representation to a farce or a sham:
"If a crucial defense is withdrawn from the
oase through the fai'lure of counsel to investigate
carefully all defenses of fact and law, the defendant
has not received adequate representation." 414 P.
2d at 819. (Emphasis added.)

In the instant case, the appellant has made no factual
allegations establishing a possible defense which may have
been crucial at the time of his sentencing. He simply alleges
that he had not seen his coun.s·el until the time he was called
before the trial court for sentencing.
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According to Utah law, the appellant has the burden
to justify upsetting a conviction on habeas corpus, Syddall
V. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 263, 437 P. 2d 194 (1968), and must
allege sufficient facts to show that he was not adequately
represented by counsel. Id. at 265. The appellant has not
met this burden in the instant case; thus, the judgment of
the court below should be affirmed.
POINT V.
APPELLANT WAS FULLY ADVISED OF THE
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA OF GUILTY.
The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his
guilty plea on the grounds that the court did not advise him
of the consequences thereof. The respondent submits, hmrever, that the appellant was thoroughly advised of the consequences of his plea by his own counsel, the public defender. The transcript of appellant's plea of guilty, pages
2 and 3, support this contention.
THE COURT: Alright, you understand, Mr.
Lopez, if the court grants your motion to withdraw
your former plea of not guilty to this charge and to
allow you to enter a different plea, then you will
thereby subject yourself to a possible indeterminate
term in the Utah State Prison. Do you understand
that?

MR. LOPEZ: Yes.
THE COURT: Record may so -show. And based
thereon the defendant is given permission to with:
draw his former plea of not guilty to the count ot
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grand larceny. Do you desire the convenience of the
record?
sir.

MR. MITSUNAGA (defense counsel):

Yes,

THE COURT: You may.
MR. MITSUN AGA: Mr. Lopez, I'm going to
ask you some questions with regard to the plea that
you are about to enter to grand larceny. Now, you
are aware that grand larceny in the State of Utah
calls for one to ten years in the state penitentiary?
MR. LOPEZ: Yes.
MR. MITSUNAGA: Now, has anyone from my
office, either my staff or myself, offered you any
promise or probation?
MR. LOPEZ: No.
MR. MITSUNAGA: Has anyone forced you or
coerced you to get you to enter the plea you're about
rto enter?
MR. LOPEZ: No.
MR. MITSUNAGA: Are you entering the plea
on the basis of your own free will?
MR. LOPEZ: Yes.
MR. MITSUNAGA: Has either the prosecutor
or the Judge promised you any leniency or probation?
MR. LOPEZ: No.
MR. MITSUNAGA: I have nothing further,
your Honor.
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From the foregoing dialogue, it is clear that the appe].
lant understood the consequences of his plea of guilty, and
that it could result in his being sentenced to the Utah Stat.e
Prison. Moreover, his plea was voluntarily made, without
coercion or undue influence, and thus was completely in
accord with the Utah standard of accepting guilty pleas.
Strong V. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P. 2d 323 ( 1969).
The thrust of appellant's argument seems to be that
the court must advise him of the consequences of his plea,
and that for his counsel to so advise him is error, thus giv.
ing rise to habeas corpus relief. Such a contention is without merit.
In Greenwood v. Harp, 432 P. 2d 663 (Okla. Cr. 1967),

the Court of Criminal Appeals of Okliahoma rejected a
similar argument. Greenwood appealed from a denial of a
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds rbhat his plea of guilty
was not pursuant to an explanation of his constitutional
rights. However, the writ was denied because the evidence
at the hearing showed that the petitioner iwas thoroughly
advised by his counsel of aU constitutional rights relating to
his case. The Oklahoma Court affirmed the trial court's decision on the grounds that:
"From the testimony gathered at the district
court hearing, we are unable to accept petitioner's
claim that he did not knowingly enter his plea of
guilty, notwithstanding the innocent ignorance he
portrays. To accept petitioner's
tentions, in face of the testimony contamed rn tlus
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record, would make a mockery of our system of jurisprudence." 432 P. 2d at 664.
The instant case is even stronger for such a holding
than is the Greenwood case. Here the appellant was interrogated by his own counsel, in the presence of the court
'
as to his understanding of the plea he was making. Surely,
for one to argue that simply because the interrogation was
not conducted personally by the judge, would be to place
procedure over substance, and would result in "a mockery
of our system of jurisprudence." Id. at 664.
The appellant cites Belgard v. Turner, Case No. C 9569 (1969) decided by the United States District Court for
the District of Utah, Central Division, Judge Christensen,
presiding, and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969) as
authority for his contentions. However, both of these ca.ses
were decided on whether or not the record was sufficient
to show an understanding and voluntary plea of guilty, and
not on the issue of who conducted the interrogation in order
to establish a record showing the plea of guilty to be knowing and voluntary.
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court
should be affirmed on this issue.
CONCLUSION
This Court should not judicially decide the issues raised
on this appeal because of a prior final judgment which is
res judicata as to this habeas corpus proceeding.
In the alternative, if this Court accepts the issues
raised and judicially decides them, then the trial court
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should be affirmed in light of the record, the facts, and the
case law applicable to this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

